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CRIMINAL LAW-Knowledge is Not Required to Satisfy the
Aggravating Circumstance of Killing a Police Officer: State v. Comp-
ton
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Compton,' the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the
death penalty sentence that was given Joel Lee Compton for the first
degree murder of a police officer.2 Among the eleven issues raised on
appeal3 was whether the State had to prove that Compton knew his victim
was a police officer in order to make the offense eligible for the death
penalty.4
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Compton's conviction and
sentence of death,5 holding, inter alia, that knowledge was not required
1. 104 N.M. 683, 726 P.2d 837, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 291 (1986).
2. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 198 1), "The judgment of conviction
and sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court of the state of New
Mexico."
3. The other issues presented on appeal in Compton were: whether the defendant could claim the
husband-wife privilege; whether the state's argument during the sentencing hearing was improper;
whether the death penalty in this case was excessive punishment; whether the New Mexico death
penalty sentencing scheme was unconstitutional; whether the scheme violated due process; whether
the trial court erred in refusing to give Compton's jury instructions on mitigating circumstances;
whether the mitigating circumstance that "Defendant did not have any significant history of prior
criminal activity" was impermissibly vague; whether the New Mexico death penalty sentencing
scheme was unconstitutional in that it provided no standard of evidence for jury deliberations; whether
the trial court erred in permitting "death qualification" of the jury pool; and whether the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Compton,
104 N.M. at 685, 726 P.2d at 839.
4. Under New Mexico law, the status of the victim can be an "aggravating circumstance" which
by statute makes the crime eligible for the death penalty. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp.
1981) lists the seven aggravating circumstances that the sentencing body is limited to considering.
The first aggravating circumstance provides: "A. [Tihe victim was a peace officer who was acting
in the lawful discharge of an official duty when he was murdered." Id. At least one of the statutorily-
enumerated aggravating circumstances must be found before the death penalty may be imposed. Id.
at § 31-20A-4(C)(1).
5. Compton, 104 N.M. at 685, 726 P.2d at 839. Compton's sentence was later commuted to life
imprisonment as part of Governor Toney Anaya's mass commutation of all death sentences in New
Mexico on November 26, 1986. This blanket commutation was upheld in State ex rel. Schiff v.
Smith (motion argued Dec. 22, 1986) against a challenge by Bernalillo County District Attorney
Steve Schiff who sought a writ of mandamus, or in the alternative a writ of prohibition, to compel
District Court Judge Woody Smith to set a date for the execution of Compton and others on death
row. The request for the writ was denied as the New Mexico Supreme Court held in an oral decision
that the commutation was within the Governor's power to pardon under the New Mexico Constitution.
See also N.M. CONST. ART. V, §6.
For Compton, the question of how to interpret the statute under which he was sentenced to die
is now moot. However, the aggravating circumstance of killing a police officer still exists and could
form the basis for future death sentences and appeals similar to the Compton case.
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on the part of the accused to satisfy the statutory aggravating circumstance
of killing a police officer.6 This Note will examine two factors that in-
fluenced the decision in Compton. First, it will discuss the court's reading
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Feola7
and the New Mexico court's confusion over the applicability of the Feola
rationale to the Compton case. Second, this Note will look at how the
criminal law principles of deterrence and retribution necessitate a re-
quirement of knowledge on the part of the accused regarding his victim's
identity, and how the lack of such a requirement renders the statute
constitutionally suspect. Finally, this Note will present several alternatives
to the court's "strict liability"reading of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance in Compton that may bolster the statute's effectiveness and
constitutionality.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joel Lee Compton arrived in Albuquerque in February 1983 with his
wife and her young daughter.8 Unable to find work and nearly destitute,
Compton began to drink excessively.9 One night, after drinking at a local
bar, Compton returned to the motel where he was staying and forced his
way into the room adjacent to his."0 His neighbors ejected Compton from
their room, but Compton returned with a rifle and began punching out
windows." At this point, the fight spilled over into the parking lot.' 2 A
passing couple saw the rifle and called the police. 
3
Officer Gerald Cline arrived on the scene, along with a civilian who
was participating in the Police Department's "Ride-along" program.' 4
Compton disappeared into the shadows near his room.' 5 As Cline ap-
proached the spot where Compton had been, a shot rang out and Cline
collapsed.' 6 Compton then emerged from the shadows, stood over the
6. Compton, 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
7. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
8. Compton, 104 N.M. at 686, 726 P.2d at 840.
9. Id.
10. Id. Compton had rented Room 24 at the Tewa Lodge on Central Avenue. Id. He forced his
way into Room 25 ostensibly to tell his neighbors to lower the volume of the music they were
playing. Id.
11. Id.
12. id.
13. Id. The fight was broken up, and although Compton had been injured during the fracas, he
managed to regain control of the rifle. Id. He fired a shot into the street and everyone scattered. Id.
He then returned inside his room and asked his wife how everything was outside. Id. She replied
that the police were coming. Id.
14. Id. The account of the shooting is based on the testimony of Alfred Gibson, the citizen who
was participating in the police department's "Ride-along" program. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Cline had left his revolver in its holster while he investigated the scene. Id. He reported
through his walkie-talkie that a subject was walking away. Id.
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officer, and walked away. 7 Cline was later determined to have died almost
instantly from a bullet wound through the heart. "
Compton was tried and convicted of first degree murder.'9 At the sen-
tencing phase of his trial,2" the jury found that the aggravating circum-
stance of killing a peace officer existed, and upon deliberation, recommended
that Compton be sentenced to death.2' The conviction and sentence were
17. Id. Compton then ran across the street and pointed the gun through a car window at a couple
who had driven up to a nearby restaurant. Id. Noticing the arrival of other police cars. Compton
threw the rifle onto the roof of the car and proceeded to lie down, spread-eagled, in the parking lot.
Id. The police apprehended Compton in this position. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 685, 726 P.2d at 839. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) all first
degree murders are deemed capital felonies, and thereby eligible for the death penalty should an
aggravating circumstance exist.
Compton was also tried, convicted, and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for the
commission of aggravated assault. Compton, 104 N.M. at 685, 726 P.2d at 839.
20. The New Mexico statutory scheme prescribing the procedure for sentencing in death penalty.
cases is as follows:
After the defendant is found guilty of a capital felony, i.e., first degree murder, a separate sentencing
proceeding is conducted to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-20A-I(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981). This separate sentencing
proceeding takes place immediately following the trial before the same judge and jury as the original
trial. Id.
At this penalty phase of the proceedings, both prosecution and defense may present additional
evidence beyond what was adduced at trial and may present witnesses who typically would testify
to the defendant's character and chances for rehabilitation. Id. at § 31-20A-1(C). In deliberating,
the jury considers the existence and relative weight of "aggravating" and "mitigating" circumstances,
as enumerated in sections 5 and 6 of the death penalty statutes. Id. at § 31-20A-2(A). The New
Mexico death penalty scheme outlines seven "aggravating circumstances" and nine "mitigating
circumstances." Id. at §§ 31-20A-5, 31-20A-6. Although the jury may consider only those seven
aggravating circumstances that are statutorily-defined, it may consider any mitigating factor it deems
relevant, whether listed in the statute or not. Id. at § 31-20A-2.
After the sentencing proceeding is completed, the jury retires to deliberate. Before it may rec-
ommend the death penalty, the jury must fulfill the following procedural requirements outlined by
the statute:
(1) The jury must unanimously find one of the aggravating circumstances listed
in the statute to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and also must specify which
circumstance, if any, that it does find. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-20A-3 (Rep].
Pamp. 1981); (2) The jury must weigh whatever aggravating circumstances it
finds exist against any mitigating factors that it deems worthy of consideration,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) and (3) The jury may
recommend the death penalty only if it reaches that decision unanimously.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-20A-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
The extensive guidelines and numerous constraints of the New Mexico capital punishment sen-
tencing scheme reflect the concern over procedure that was engendered by the landmark United
States Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which held that givingjuries too much discretion in choosing whether to impose the death penalty constituted a violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For further discussion of New
Mexico's death penalty sentencing statutes, see Silver, Constitutionality of the New Mexico Capital
Punishment Statute, I I N.M.L. REV. 269 (1981).
21. Compton, 104 N.M. 685, 726 P.2d at 839.
The jury was not asked to consider whether Compton knew that his victim was a peace officer,
although defense counsel offered jury instructions to this effect. Defendant-Appellant's Brief-in-
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automatically sent up to the New Mexico Supreme Court for review as
required by law.22 The supreme court upheld both the conviction for first
degree murder and.the sentence of death.23 In reaching its conclusion,
the court held that in order for a jury to find the aggravating circumstance
of killing a peace officer, the jury need not determine that the accused
knew his victim was a police officer at the time of the killing.24 Rather,
the State need only show that the victim was a peace officer engaged in
the lawful discharge of his duties at the time of the killing.25
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In reaching its conclusion, the Compton court read incorrectly the
United States Supreme Court case on which it relied, United States v.
Feola,26 and also failed to closely consider the intent of the New Mexico
legislature in drafting the statutory aggravating circumstance of killing a
peace officer. Although the court was influenced by what it perceived as
the resolution of a similar mens rea27 issue in Feola, Part A of this Analysis
will show how the court's reliance on that case was misplaced.
Part B will examine how the court's strict liability interpretation of the
statute as not requiring proof of any particular mental state regarding the
identity of the victim renders the statute constitutionally suspect. Although
the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the exact issue
posed by Compton,28 this Note will suggest that the views of the Court
Chief at 3, State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 726 P.2d 837, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 291 (1986).
The trial court rejected these tendered instructions. Compton, 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
In their place, the court instructed the jury according to New Mexico's uniform jury instructions,
which only required the jury to find that Cline "I. [w]as a peace officer; and 2. was performing his
duties as a peace officer," at the time he was killed. UJI Crim. 14-7014 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
22. See supra note 2.
23. Compton, 104 N.M. at 685, 726 P.2d at 839.
24. Id. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847. The court stated: "Thus, we determine that the jury was properly
instructed on the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer." Id.
25. Id.
26. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
27. The concept of mens rea has been described as follows: "Criminal liability rests on two basic
requirements: proscribed conduct that includes a voluntary act or omission and a blameworthy state
of mind. These requirements are termed actus reus and mens rea, respectively. Neither is sufficient
to establish liability; both must be present." Romero, New Mexico Mens Rea Doctrines, 8 N.M.L.
REv. 127, 128 (1978).
28. The United States Supreme Court denied Compton's petition f r certiorari in a memorandum
decision that contained only the customary dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall to all death
penalty cases: "Adhering to our views that he death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, [citation omitted], we would
grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case." Compton v. New Mexico, cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 291 (1986).
The Court had previously denied certiorari to a Missouri case that posed virtually the same issue
as Compton, Baker v. Missouri, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). In Baker, Justice Marshall
filed avigorous dissent arguing that imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who had not
been proven to know his victim's identity violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 1187. Marshall's dissent was cited by Justice Walters in her special
concurrence to Compton. Compton, 104 N.M. at 696, 726 P.2d at 850 (Walters, J., specially
concurring).
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already expressed cast doubt on the constitutional vitality of the New
Mexico Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute challenged in Comp-
ton.
Finally, Part C will discuss the court's failure to consider alternative
interpretations of the statute. These alternative interpretations consist of
construing the statute either to require knowledge, notwithstanding the
statute's silence, or to impose a different standard of mens rea-for
example, recklessness or negligence.
A. The Court's Reliance on United States v. Feola
In support of its conclusion, the New Mexico court adopted the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Feola29 that a federal statute proscribing
assaults on federal officers did not require that the offender know his
victim was a federal officer.3" However, the New Mexico Court failed to
adequately examine the rationale behind the Feola decision, and, as a
result, the court's reliance on Feola was misplaced.
In Feola, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of
a defendant who had been charged with assaulting federal officers.3 The
statute proscribing assaults on federal officers is silent as to whether
knowledge of the victim's status is required in order to sustain a convic-
tion.32 Upon examining the legislative history of the statute, the Court
concluded that the statute required only proof of intent to assault, not
proof of intent to assault someone known to be a federal officer.33
The Court's decision not to require knowledge as an element of the
29. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
30. Id. at 684. The Court stated: "All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to
assault a federal officer." Id.
31. Id. at 676. The defendant in Feola was also charged and convicted of conspiring to commit
the assault, under 18 U.S.C. 371 (1940). Id. at 673. Discussion of the conspiracy conviction is
outside the scope of this Note.
32. The statute proscribing assault states:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes
with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on
account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. 111 (1948).
Although the statute does not specifically require knowledge of the victim's identity, it does contain
language that suggests that someone who violated the statute would ordinarily have such knowledge.
For example, with the exception of undercover agents, it is difficult to imagine that someone who
assaults a federal officer "on account of" that officer's performance of an official duty would not
have some idea of that officer's identity. Indeed, the victim's status as an agent of the federal
government may be precisely the reason prompting the assault.
Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissent to Feola that the language of the statute was originally
limited to cover only assaults on federal officers "on account of" their official duties. Feola, 420
U.S. at 702 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The phrase "while engaged in" was not added until the statute
was recodified in 1948. Id. This observation forms the basis for Justice Stewart's argument that the
statute as originally passed was intended to embody a knowledge requirement, and that the change
in 1948 was not designed to dispense with this requirement. Id.
33. Id. at 686.
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federal statute hinged upon its interpretation of the statute's purpose.'
The Court viewed the act's primary purpose to be the protection of federal
officers by granting jurisdiction to federal courts to try cases involving
such offenses." The Court considered state courts to be "inadequate" to
protect federal officers because state officials might not prosecute indi-
viduals charged with assaulting federal agents with the same vigor as they
would if the victim were a state officer.36 To give the statute the broadest
possible application and thereby bring the greatest number of alleged
offenders before the federal courts, the Court dispensed with a requirement
34. Id. at 679.
35. See generally Feola, 420 U.S. at 680-84. There were two interpretations of the legislative
purpose behind enacting a federal law which proscribed certain offenses directed against federal
officers. Id. at 683. The first interpretation was that access to the federal courts was necessary to
ensure that the greatest efforts would be made to prosecute offenders and vindicate the federal victim.
Id. at 683-84. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. Making it a federal crime to assault federal
officers brought these cases under federal jurisdiction. Feola, 420 U.S. at 684-85.
Under this interpretation of the statute's purpose, the identity of the victim is important only
insofar as it triggers federal jurisdiction. Id. at 677 n.9. Since the officer's identity is relevant only
to determine where the case is tried, the State need not show that the alleged offender had such
knowledge. Id. at 685. The Court accepted this interpretation of the statute's purpose and stated:
"[Eixistence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at
the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute." Id. at 677 n.9.
The Court did not fully accept the second interpretation presented which called for a knowledge
requirement and reasoned that the statute was intended to close an apparent gap in state substantive
law. Id. at 683. This gap was created when states enacted laws mandating increased punishment for
assaults on state peace officers, but not federal officers. Id. See, e.g., N.M.STAT. ANN. § 30-22-22
(Repl. Pamp. 1984). In such states, assaults on federal officers would be prosecuted as general
assaults with no threat of increased punishment. Feola, 420 U.S. at 683. To close this gap, a parallel
federal law was needed that punished assaults on federal officers to the same or higher degree as
assaults on state officers. Id. Such a federal statute would have the same mens rea requirement as
its state counterpart, which the Court assumed to demand knowledge. Id.
Although the Court in Feola recognized such a gap in state substantive law, it declined to view
the enactment of Feola's predecessor statute solely as an attempt to close this gap. Id. The Court
so declined because there was a another section to the predecessor statute (§ I of the Act of May
18, 1934, ch. 299, 48 Stat. 781 (1934)) that proscribed the killing of federal officers. Id. State law
at the time typically punished all murders by death, whether the victim was a federal peace officer,
a state officer, or a civilian; therefore, no "gap" existed in that area of state law. Id.
The Court reasoned that by passing a single act with both sections, Congress was ". . . not only
filling one gap in state substantive law but in large part was duplicating state proscriptions in order
to insure a federal forum for the trial of offenses involving federal officers." Id. (emphasis added).
The Court rejected the option of treating the two sections of the statute differently, declining to
bifurcate its interpretation of the statute. Id. at 684 n. 18. The result of the Court's refusal to view
the statute solely as a gap-filler was to emphasize the jurisdictional purpose of the statute and diminish
the importance of a mens rea requirement.
36. Id. at 684. The Court stated:
[I]t would not be unreasonable to suppose that state officials would not always
or necessarily share congressional feelings of urgency as to the necessity of
prompt and vigorous prosecutions of those who violate the safety of the federal
officer. From the days of prohibition to the days of the modem civil rights
movement, the statutes federal agents have sworn to uphold and enforce have
not always been popular in every corner of the Nation.
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that the accused have knowledge of his victim's identity.37 As the Court
succinctly summarized, "In a case of this kind the offender takes his
victim as he finds him."
38
The New Mexico Supreme Court quoted the above language in Feola
to support its holding in Compton. 9 However, the Compton court failed
to note that while both statutes embodied a similar legislative intent to
protect peace officers, they differed in how they accomplished that pur-
pose. The federal statute was designed to afford protection through the
creation of a federal forum." The New Mexico statute was not needed
to confer jurisdiction on state courts for offenses against peace officers
committed in New Mexico, as such jurisdiction was already conferred
generally by the New Mexico Constitution.4 Therefore, the New Mexico
legislature must have had another goal in mind when it passed the Compton
statute. 2
Most likely, the legislature considered the statute's value to be its effect
as a deterrent. By imposing the death penalty for the murder of a peace
officer-a harsher penalty than would normally apply to murder cases-
the legislature must have been attempting to deter attacks on a group that
it felt especially deserving of such protection. In addition to the deterrent
value of the statute, morale among peace officers may well have been
improved by the legislative acknowledgement of the unusual risks that
are faced by law enforcement officers.
Deterrence, however, is a fundamentally different type of protective
mechanism from the type of protection afforded by the statute in Feola.44
The failure to recognize this distinction made the New Mexico Supreme
Court's reliance on Feola misplaced. Had the court in Compton perceived
37. Id.
38. Id. at 685.
39. Compton, 104 N.M. at 692, 726 P.2d at 846.
40. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
41. Article VI of the New Mexico Constitution deals with the creation of the judicial branch of
state government and states: "The district 'court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and
causes not excepted in this constitution. ... N.M.CONST. ART. VI, § 13. Jurisdiction over killings
of peace officers is nowhere excepted in the Constitution.
42. Unfortunately, the legislative history of statutes passed by the New Mexico Legislature is not
documented. Therefore, legislative intent must be inferred from the statute itself.
43. Feola refers to the prohibition against attacks on peace officers as "a matter essential to the
morale of all federal law enforcement personnel." Feola, 420 U.S. at 685 n. 18.
44. Notwithstanding Justice Stewart's trenchant dissent, see supra note 32, the Feola opinion
gives scant attention to the concept of deterrence. As discussed, the Court seized on the importance
of creating a federal forum in order to afford federal agents protection. See supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text. This view of the statute focuses on what occurs after the alleged violation has
taken place, namely, where the accused is brought to trial. A discussion of deterrence necessarily
addresses what occurs before a violation takes place, namely, whether the actor was deterred from
committing an offense by the threat of punishment. The Court's conclusion that the statute's purpose
was to create jurisdiction, therefore, obviated much discussion of the statute's value as a deterrent.
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the statute's basis as being firmly grounded in deterrence, the court may
have seen the necessity of requiring some degree of knowledge of the
victim's identity.
The Compton court misapplied the Feola rationale in another way. The
court quoted the following passage from Feola, but changed the last word
in a revealing exercise of judicial license: "The concept of criminal intent
does not extend so far as to require that the actor understand not only
the nature of his act but also its consequence for the choice of a judicial
[remedy]. "" The passage as it originally appeared in Feola used the word
"forum" in place of "remedy. 
4 6
By changing the last word, the Compton court worked a subtle shift
in the rationale and focus of the Feola opinion that lent support to the
holding the New Mexico court desired to reach. The original sentence
expressed the view that traditional mens rea doctrine does not require
that an accused have knowledge at the time he acts of the jurisdictional
consequences of his action. The question of criminal intent is satisfied if
the actor understands the nature of his act.47
The Compton court's version of the sentence changes the meaning to
suggest that traditional mens rea doctrine does not require that the actor
have knowledge of the "judicial remedy" that his act might trigger.
Although the Compton court does not explain what it means by the phrase
"judicial remedy," remedy generally means the method by which the
judicial system will enforce a right or redress the violation of a right.48
In a criminal law context, the phrase parallels the notion of punishment.
The Compton court's version therefore suggests that an actor need not
know the extent to which he may be punished for engaging in certain
proscribed activity.49 The Compton court went astray when it applied this
view of criminal intent-that knowledge need not extend to the punish-
ment prescribed for a particular crime-to the aggravating circumstance
of killing a peace officer. The court chose to treat the victim's identity
purely as a circumstance "surrounding and attending a capital murder"
45. Compton, 104 N.M. at 692, 726 P. 2d at 846.
46. Feola, 420 U.S. at 685.
47. Id.
48. Black's Law Dictionary defines remedy as "The means by which a right is enforced, or the
violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (5th
ed. 1979).
49. The court's view is consistent with traditional notions of criminal intent. The fact that a
mistake of law is not usually a defense to a criminal violation demonstrates that our legal system
does not require that an accused be aware of the forbidden nature of the act he is committing. See
generally W. LAFAVE AND A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW, 412-416 (2nd ed. 1986) [Hereinafter cited as
LaFave & Scott]. This idea is embodied in the maxim, "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." Similarly,
it is no defense to argue that one did not know the extent to which an act was punishable. Id.
[Vol. 17
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rather than as an element of capital murder itself.5" This treatment allowed
the court to reason that because the victim's identity bears only on the
issue of punishment, whether the accused knew the victim's identity at
the time of the offense is outside the scope of criminal intent." The
court's re-wording of the passage from Feola supported this conclusion
and demonstrates another way in which reliance on Feola was misplaced.
B. The Principles of Deterrence and Retribution as Applied to
Compton
Deterrence and retribution are two theories of punishment that underlie
much of criminal law. 2 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
deterrence and retribution as the only two permissible justifications for
the imposition of the death penalty." Without a "knowledge" require-
ment, it is doubtful that the Compton statute meets either of these goals,
and therefore may not be capable of withstanding constitutional scrutiny.
1. Deterrence
The Compton court recognized that one of the goals inherent in the
statutory aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer is the pro-
tection of police officers.' By not requiring knowledge of the victim's
identity, however, the court removed the linchpin from the deterrent
mechanism afforded by the statute. In so doing, the court not only di-
minished the statute's effectiveness but also rendered the law constitu-
tionally suspect.
50. Compton, 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
This approach contrasts with that adopted in some states which makes the victim's identity as a
peace officer one of the elements for the offense of "capital murder". See, e.g., the Texas statutory
definition of "Capital Murder":
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section
19.02 (a)(I) of this code and:
(I) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer
or fireman;
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974) (emphasis added).
51. Compton, 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
52. See generally, LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 49, at 25-27.
53. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
[Tihe death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Unless the death penalty. . . measurably
contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering' and hence an unconstitutional
punishment (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
Id. at 798.
54. Compton, 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
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Deterrence is generally described as a theory of punishment under
which the threat of being punished discourages a potential criminal from
engaging in criminal activity.5" For a deterrent to be effective, the actor
must be aware that he is engaging in the type of activity that may trigger
the appropriate punitive response.56 If Compton did not know that his
victim was a police officer, he could not have been deterred by the
aggravating circumstance that triggers the possibility of capital punish-
ment for such an offense. Therefore, the only deterrent in such a situation
would be the threat of whatever punishment accompanied the murder of
a civilian.57 Thus, by not requiring that the defendant have knowledge
of his victim's status, the Compton court effectively reduced the deterrent
value of the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer to that
of a simple first degree murder statute.
In addition, the reading of the statute in Compton as not requiring
knowledge may render it unconstitutional. The hallmark of the United
States Supreme Court death penalty cases has been the Court's constant
admonition that capital punishment must not be imposed in an arbitrary
or capricious manner.58 In refining this standard, the Court has stated that
the death penalty must measurably contribute to either the goal of retri-
bution or the goal of deterrence in order to escape the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.59 Justice Marshall stated
in a dissent to a denial of certiorari that reviewed a statute very similar
to the one in Compton, that knowledge is a necessary component of such
a statute to avoid running afoul of the constitution.6
Instead of seizing on the necessary nexus between knowledge and
deterrence, the New Mexico Supreme Court confused knowledge of the
elements that enhance a crime with knowledge of the fact that a crime
carries an enhanced penalty. In Compton, the element that enhanced the
crime was the victim's identity as a police officer.6" The court failed to
distinguish between knowledge of this element and knowledge of the fact
55. See generally LAFAVE & Scow, supra note 49, at 24-25.
56. One of the best examples of the nature of deterrence is a scene from the film Dr. Strangelove.
In the title role, Peter Sellers is told that the Russians have developed a secret "Doomsday Machine"
that is triggered automatically in the event of a nuclear strike. Sellers cannot conceal his frustration
as he asks of the Russian Ambassador: "But the whole point of such a machine is lost unless you
tell people about it. Why didn't you announce it to the world?" Dr. Strangelove (Columbia Pictures
1963).
57. In New Mexico, the maximum punishment for first degree murder without any aggravating
circumstances is life imprisonment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
58. The landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), announced the principle that
"[Tlhe penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial
risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980).
59. See supra note 52.
60. Baker v. Missouri, cert. denied 459 U.S. 1183, 1186 (1983).
61. Compton, 104 N.M. at 692, 726 P.2d at 846. See also supra note 4.
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that an enhanced penalty existed for killing a police officer. The Compton
court collapsed this distinction in its analysis of a series of statutes that
purportedly do not require knowledge.62
One of the statutes the court examined was the habitual criminal en-
hancement statute.63 This statute mandates that a defendant's sentence be
lengthened according to the number of prior felonies he has committed. 6'
The court observed that in order to impose the increased sentence, the
State would not have to show that a defendant knew that he would be
subjecting himself to an enhanced sentence if he committed another crime.'
Such knowledge would be outside the scope of traditional mens rea
requirements.'
However, the habitual criminal enhancement statute is distinguishable
from the statute at issue in Compton. The former bears only on the
sentencing of a defendant67 whereas the Compton statute deals with an
important aspect of the underlying offense-namely, who the victim was.
Although raised only during the sentencing stage of the trial,6' proof of
any aggravating circumstance necessarily refers to facts established during
62. Compton, 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847. It is not clear that the statutes selected by the
court in fact illustrate this point. Among the statutes the court examined are ones that proscribe
certain uses of a deadly weapon. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-I to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). These statutes
do not on their face indicate whether knowledge of the weapon's "deadliness" is an element of the
offense. Id. Case law, however, has interpreted the question of deadliness to be one for the jury to
determine based on a factual examination of the weapon's character and manner of use. State v.
Conwell, 36 N.M. 253, 13 P.2d 554 (1932).
It is arguable that such a determination of deadliness would inevitably reflect the jury's assessment
of whether the user of such a weapon in fact knew, or at least should have known, that the instrument
she wielded was "deadly". Therefore, the "deadly weapon" statutes may in fact require some degree
of knowledge, even if only a negligence standard of mens rea (see infra Section C). If the jury
gives any consideration to the circumstances of a crime to determine deadliness, then it is going
beyond the scope of the inquiry permitted in Compton, where the jury was limited to determining
whether the victim was a police officer at the time of the shooting, not whether it was apparent from
the circumstances that he held such an occupation. Thus, the deadly weapon statute does not
necessarily lend support for a "no knowledge" interpretation of the Compton statute.
Another statute the Compton court claims does not require knowledge is a statute imposing an
enhanced penalty if the victim is over sixty years of age. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-16.1 (Repl.
Pamp. 1981). This statute also could be interpreted as requiring some degree of knowledge based
on whether the defendant knew or had reason to know the victim's age. The statute may simply
reflect the legislature's judgment that a person's age is fairly apparent and may be surmised from
the circumstances, and that an explicit knowledge requirement would unduly burden the prosecution.
Alternatively, the omission of a required mental state for age may have been inadvertent. Perhaps
most likely, the legislature may not have included any reference to mens rea requirements because
it lacked the proper framework in which to consider the possibilities. Mens rea is an area of criminal
law that has been notoriously burdened by confusing and imprecise terms. See infra Section C. See
generally Romero, New Mexico Mens Rea Doctrines, 8 N.M.L. REV. 127 (1978).
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-17 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
64. Id.
65. Compton. 104 N.M. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
66. See supra note 49.
67. See supra note 61.
68. See supra note 20.
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the preceeding stage where a defendant's guilt is established for the
underlying offense.
Knowledge that a specific criminal act carries with it a certain punish-
ment is quite different from knowledge of a particular element that forms
part of a crime. Compton's interpretation of the knowledge requirement
did not turn on whether he was aware of the existence of the statutory
aggravating circumstance of killing a police officer. Rather, his view of
criminal intent dictated that the State must demonstrate that the killer
knew who his victim was before it could punish him extraordinarily for
killing a member of a specially-protected class.
The Compton court failed to answer how deterrence is served when
the subjective state of mind of the defendant is removed from the jury's
consideration. The resultant weakening of the deterrent value of the statute
removes one of the constitutional bases on which the death penalty may
rest. 69 With deterrence no longer a viable justification for the statute in
Compton, the only other valid constitutional basis for imposing the death
penalty remains retribution.7"
2. Retribution
The theory of retribution, also called "revenge," "retaliation," and
"just deserts,"" calls for the infliction of punishment because ". . . it
is only fitting and just that one who has caused harm should himself
suffer for it. "72 Retribution may be justified on a number of different
grounds, including emotional compensation for the victim,73 the need to
restore peace of mind to society,74 and as a means of suppressing acts of
private vengeance.75 By refusing to infuse the aggravating circumstance
of killing a peace officer with a mens rea component, the Compton court
severely weakened the retributive purpose of the statute.
Retribution stands, along with deterrence, as one of the two consti-
tutionally permissible bases for the death penalty.76 The United States
Supreme Court views retribution as being strongly linked to the defend-
ant's mental state at the time the criminal act is committed.77 The Court's
69. See supra note 52.
70. Id.
71. LAFAVE & Scotr, supra note 49, at 25-26.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id. at 26 n.38.
74. Id. at 26.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 52.
77. Enmund v. Florida, 458'U.S. 782 (1982). In reviewing a sentence of death which had been
imposed upon a defendant for his participation in a robbery that resulted in a murder, the Court
commented:
As for retribution as a justification for executing Enmund [the defendant], we
think this very much depends on the degree of Enmund's culpability-what
Enmund's intentions, expectations, and actions were. American criminal law
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emphasis on retribution as being proportionate to the defendant's moral
blameworthiness rests on the fundamental assumption that causing inten-
tional harm is more reprehensible than causing unintentional harm, and
therefore should be punished more severely.78 This view formed the basis
for the Court's reversal of a Florida defendant's sentence of death fol-
lowing his conviction for robbery and felony murder.79 Observing that
the defendant did not kill or intend to kill, the Court held that the State
could not impose the same punishment on him as on a defendant who
had manifested those intentions.'
The application of the Enmund reasoning to the holding in Compton
reveals the inequities inherent in the New Mexico Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the statutory aggravating circumstance of killing a peace
officer. Under the Compton holding, the following scenario is possible:
A, a drug dealer, kills one of his customers in order to steal his money.
B, also a drug dealer, kills one of his customers for the same reason.
However, unknown to B at the time of the killing, B's victim is an
undercover narcotics agent. B would be eligible for capital punishment
under the statutory aggravating circumstance applied in Compton. Under
has long considered a defendant's intention-and therefore his moral guilt-
to be critical to 'the degree of [his] criminal culpability' (quoting Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)) and the Court has found criminal penalties
to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrong-doing.
Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
The Court in Enmund thus held that the death penalty could not be imposed on a defendant who
had neither killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id. at 801. The Court, however, did not
elaborate on what types of mental states would satisfy the intent requirement. Id. The issue of what
kind of "intent" would prove constitutionally acceptable had to await a later day.
That day arrived with the Court's decision in Tison v. Arizona, 55 U.S.L.W. 4496 (April 21,
1987). In Tison, the Court announced, in a 5-4 decision, that the death penalty could be based in
a felony-murder case upon a finding that the defendant played a major role in the commission of
the underlying felony and also manifested a "reckless indifference to human life." Id. at 4502.
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent arguing that Enmund precluded the Court's
holding in Tison, id. at 4506, the standard adopted by the majority still requires a finding of some
culpable mental state.
In requiring at least a showing of "reckless indifference", the Court acknowledged the importance
of an individualized determination of culpability to our legal tradition. Id. at 4501. Moreover, the
Court specifically rejected as too broad a standard the lower court's formulation of a "foreseeability"
test of intent. Id. at 4500. Such a test would have permitted the State to impose the death penalty
based upon a showing that the defendant ". . . anticipated ... that life would or might be taken
in accomplishing the underlying felony (citation omitted)." Id. In rejecting the "foreseeability"
standard, the Court sought to fulfill the dictates of Enmund by requiring that the state show at a
minimum that the defendant acted with a reckless indifference for human life. Id. The Compton
court, however, did not even require a finding of reckless indifference on the part of the defendant.
Rather, the Compton court refused to inquire at all into the mental state of the defendant. Compton,
104 N.M. 683, 693, 726 P.2d 837, 847. Consequently, the Compton decision stands in marked
contrast to both Enmund and Tison.
78. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrrY, 162 (1968). Hart is quoted both in
Justice Walters' special concurrence in Compton, 104 N.M. at 696, 726 P.2d at 850, and in the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Enmund, 458 U.S. 782, 798.
79. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
80. Id.
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Compton, it would be irrelevant that B did not know who his victim was.
B would be subject to the death penalty even though his knowledge,
mental state, and moral blameworthiness would be identical to A's, who
would be subject only to a maximum of life imprisonment.
Such unequal treatment would be inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court's edict in Enmund requiring a close nexus between a
defendant's personal responsibility and the punishment inflicted.8' Pun-
ishment that is not linked to intent does not serve the end of retribution.82
Without meeting either of the goals of deterrence or retribution, it is
questionable whether the reading given the statute in Compton by the
New Mexico Supreme Court would pass constitutional muster.
C. Alternatives to the Compton Interpretation
The Compton court was faced with the common judicial conundrum
of wrestling with the inscrutable problem of mens rea. The analysis of
mens rea issues is often beset by many difficulties.83 Among these prob-
lems is the silence of many statutes as to what mental state is required,84
a problem faced by the court in Compton. In concluding that the statute
imposed strict liability, the Compton court failed to consider two alter-
native interpretations that may have resulted in a different outcome. First,
the court did not entertain the possibility that although the legislature left
the statute silent, it may still have envisioned the offense as requiring
some degree of mens rea. Second, the court did not consider the possibility
of imposing a mens rea standard other than absolute knowledge, such as
a recklessness or negligence standard.
1. The Ambiguity of Silence as to Mens Rea Requirements.
A statute's silence as to the mental state required does not necessarily
mean that the legislature intended to dispense with mens rea altogether. 85
81. Id. at 801.
82. Id. "Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and had no
intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring
that the criminal gets his just deserts." Id.
83. Among the problems that have traditionally plagued mens rea analysis are the use of vague,
imprecise, and overlapping terms to describe mental states; the application of a single mens rea term
to an offense that has several actus reus elements; and a statute's silence as to mens rea requirements
altogether. See generally Romero, supra note 27, at 128-130 (1978); see also LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra
note 48, at 213-215. Thankfully, for both the court, this author, and at this point probably the reader,
the Compton statute presented only the latter type of problem.
84. See generally Romero, supra note 27, at 128-130 (1978); see also LAFAVE & SCor, supra
note 49, at 213-215.
85. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 49, at 243.
[The absence of words in the statute requiring a certain mental state does not
warrant the assumption that the legislature intended to impose strict liability;
to the contrary . . . it should be presumed that the legislature intended to follow
the usual mens rea requirement 'unless excluded expressly or by necessary
implication' (citation omitted).
Id. at 409. See also Romero, supra note 27, at 131.
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In fact, the presumption in construing silent statutes favors finding a mens
rea requirement over finding that the statute imposes strict liability.
86
Statutes that have been construed to impose strict liability are usually
limited to regulatory offenses that carry a relatively light penalty, such
as traffic offenses, or areas where knowledge is particularly hard to prove,
such as laws governing the sale of pure foods, liquor and narcotics. 87 The
Compton statute does not appear to fall within the realm of strict liability
offenses.
In determining whether a particular statute imposes strict liability, courts
may consider different factors." One such factor is the nature of the
punishment provided for the offense.8 9 Generally, if the punishment is
severe, the statute will be interpreted as requiring some degree of knowl-
edge.' The punishment triggered by killing a peace officer is the most
severe permitted by our criminal justice system--the death penalty. Al-
though no single factor is dispositive of whether a statute imposes strict
liability, the weight of this factor alone in favor of finding a mens rea
requirement would be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. 9 If the
86. Id. at 409. See also Romero, supra note 27, at 131. In State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516,
524, 118 P.2d 280, 286 (1941), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe legislature may
forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal, without regard to the intent with which
such act is done; but in such case it must clearly appear from the Act (from its language or clear
inference) that such was the legislative intent."
87. LAFAVE & Scott, supra note 49, at 242 n. 1.
Knowledge may be difficult to prove in the areas of "pure" food, liquor, and narcotics law, simply
because of the factual situations involving the sale of such goods. Id. It may be problematic to show
that the seller of mislabelled drugs knew that the drugs were so mislabelled, yet for policy reasons
we may still wish to hold the seller criminally liable for the sale of such goods. Id.
88. Id. at 244. LaFave and Scott describe seven factors that courts may consider. Id. at 244-45.
"Severity of punishment" is the most germane to the statute in Compton. See accompanying text.
89. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 49, at 244.
90. id.
91. Another factor is "[tihe number of prosecutions to be expected.... The fewer the expected
prosecutions, the more likely the legislature meant to require the prosecuting officials to go into the
issue of fault .. ." Id. at 245. This factor also weighs in favor of finding a mens rea requirement
in the Compton statute, as it seems unlikely that the legislature would anticipate the number of
prosecutions for killing a peace officer to be higher than other homicides, none of which are strict
liability offenses.
The only factor that may slightly tilt the scales in the direction of strict liability is "[tihe seriousness
of harm to the public which may be expected to follow from the forbidden conduct . . . [tihe more
serious the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature meant to impose liability
without regard to fault. ... Id. at 244. However great the harm may be that results from killing
a peace officer, it is possible to imagine a criminal violation with even more dire results whose
prevention might more properly warrant strict liability (e.g., the sale of impure food or drugs to the
public).
A final factor to consider that is pertinent to the facts in Compton is "[tihe difficulty prosecuting
officials would have in proving a mental state for this type of crime. The greater the difficulty, the
more likely it is that the legislature intended to relieve the prosecution of that burden so that the
law could be effectively enforced." Id. at 245. Although the difficulty of proving a defendant's state
of mind should not be minimized, the proof problem does not seem particularly more acute where
the State must show the accused had knowledge of the victim's identity than where the State must
show any other kind of knowledge. In any case, the difficulty of proving a defendant's state of mind
would depend on what mental state was required to be shown. If the requisite state were recklessness
or negligence, the difficulty would be lessened considerably. See infra Section C(2).
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court had undertaken this type of analysis to determine whether the Comp-
ton statute imposed strict liability, it is likely that it would have concluded
that the legislature intended to impose a mens rea requirement.
2. Other Possible Mens Rea Standards
In interpreting the statutory aggravating circumstance of killing a peace
officer, the Compton court limited itself to choosing between either a
requirement of knowledge or imposing strict liability. The drawbacks to
the strict liability reading have been the topic of this Note. The disad-
vantages to a requirement of actual knowledge should not, however, be
discounted. Actual knowledge could be very difficult for the prosecution
to prove because it involves the defendant's subjective state of mind.92
Therefore, a clear compromise would be to adopt either the recklessness
or the negligence standard of mens rea as outlined by the Model Penal
Code.93
92. LaFave and Scott suggest that the difficulty of proving defendant's state of mind for a particular
offense is one of the factors that courts consider in determining whether the legislature meant to
dispense with a mens rea requirement. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 49, at 245.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code provides:
Purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently are defined as follows:
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that
they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the actor's situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves
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The Model Penal Code describes four distinct states of mind that may
be used to fulfill a mens rea requirement: purposeful, knowing, reckless,
and negligent.94 Reckless and negligent states of mind require a lesser
degree of knowledge than do purposeful and knowing.9" "A person acts
recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists." '" Thus in the Compton case, the defendant may have
acted recklessly with regard to his victim's identity if Compton saw the
police car approach and witnessed someone emerge from it, but con-
sciously chose to ignore the probability that the person emerging from
the car was a police officer.
Alternatively, a person acts negligently when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists.97 Ap-
plying this standard again to the Compton facts, it might fairly be said
that the defendant acted negligently with respect to his victim's identity
if Compton did not know his victim was a police officer but a reasonable
person in Compton's situation would have known.9" Some states employ
a negligence standard in their capital murder statutes that make the murder
of a police officer an offense punishable by the death penalty."
Either by judicial interpretation or by legislative modification, the stan-
dards of recklessness or negligence could be applied to the Compton
statute. The adoption of one of these lesser degrees of mens rea would
bolster the constitutionality of the statute by requiring that the trier of
fact find the defendant acted with some culpability with respect to the
police officer's identity. Moreover, such a requirement would not unduly
burden the State in its efforts to punish those who take the lives of its
law enforcement officers.
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation.
Id.
94. id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Note, however, that the Model Penal Code's definition of negligence requires that the actor's
deviation from the reasonable person standard be "gross." id. This requirement may reflect a
judgment on the part of the Code's drafters that ordinary negligence such as is used in tort law
would not be sufficient to warrant the penal sanctions and moral condemnation that normally attend
a criminal conviction.
99. See, e.g., the New York Penal Code which defines its version of capital murder as follows:
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
I. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person; and
(a) Either:
(i) the victim was a police officer. . . who was killed in the course
of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the victim was a police officer; or ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (Consol. 1974) (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In State v. Compton,'" the New Mexico Supreme Court examined the
statutory aggravating circumstance of killing a police officer and held that
the death penalty could be imposed without proving that the accused
knew his victim's identity at the time of the killing.' °' The court thus
dispensed with any requirement of knowledge, or mens rea, on the part
of the defendant with regard to her victim's identity.
The decision in Compton should have both broad and specific impact.
Prosecutors, in attempting to convince juries that the death penalty should
be imposed because the accused killed a police officer, will need only
introduce evidence that substantiates the decedent's identity.' 2 The State
will not have the additional burden of proving that the defendant knew
his victim was a police officer at the time of the killing.'03
More generally, the decision in Compton may influence how courts
perceive the knowledge requirements of other statutes that contain an
enhanced penalty based on the victim's identity." If the courts continue
to apply the Compton approach to statutes that seek to safeguard a par-
ticular class of people, the salutary goal of protection will not truly be
served. Introducing a requirement of knowledge into such statutes, either
legislatively or judicially, would give them actual value as a deterrent
device as well as protect the constitutional rights of the accused.
HENRY WIGGLESWORTH
100. 104 N.M. 683, 726 P.2d 837, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 291 (1986).
101. Id. at 693, 726 P.2d at 847.
102. See supra note 21.
103. id.
104. A similar issue of knowledge was raised and a similar holding was reached in Rutledge v.
Fort, 104 N.M. 7, 715 P.2d 455 (1986). In Rutledge, the statute under consideration proscribed
aggravated assault upon a peace officer but did not specify whether knowledge of the officer's identity
was required. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-22 (RepI. Pamp. 1984). The New Mexico Supreme
Court held that knowledge was not required, with two Justices dissenting (J. Walters and J. Sosa).
In her dissent, Justice Walter invited comparison between Compton and Rutledge, and soberly
concluded, "So dies in New Mexico in February 1986 another basic and, heretofore, solemn principle
of American jurisprudence." 104 N.M. at 10, 715 P.2d at 458. The mens rea aspect of the Rutledge
holding, however, has been recently overruled in a 3-2 decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Reese v. State of New Mexico (26 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 827 (October 8, 1987)). Reese states that
the court's earlier reliance on the Feola decision "was misplaced" (id. at 828) and includes a specially
concurring opinion by Justice Ransom which adopts the analytical framework suggested by LaFave
and Scott and discussed supra, text and accompanying footnotes 87-92. Although Reese does not
necessarily sound the death knell for the court's decision in Compton, it does suggest that the court
may be open to revisiting the mens rea issue in a death penalty case in the future.
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